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by Jeannine Gramick, SSND
Presentation delivered at Haverford College, Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 16, 2000
In
the course of history, society has seen repressive regimes, such as fascist and
totalitarian states, use the methods of secrecy and silencing to control the
behavior and even the thoughts of the dominated masses. Because public
discussion of issues can question and challenge the status quo and the
rule of the current government, common dialogue is feared and forbidden under
oppressive governments. Dissenters are silenced or disappeared. The power of
the autocrats must be maintained at all costs. Religious authorities, no less
than secular ones, have also used secrecy and silencing as methods of enforcing
orthodoxy. In the history of the Roman Catholic Church, we have seen the index
of forbidden books, secret trials of the Spanish and Roman Inquisitions, the
silencing of scientific and theological views; e.g., Galileo and the early
twentieth century modernist theologians. Closer to our own experience in the
latter part of the twentieth century, many of us recall the silencing of
Leonardo Boff, Matthew Fox, John McNeill, Yvonne Geberra and the disappearance
of Hans Kung and Charles Curran from Catholic academic institutions. Are we to
interpret these secrecies, silencings, and disappearances as an ecclesiastical
counterpart to the abuse of power that civilized societies have witnessed in
secular governments? Or is there a more benign interpretation?
We
human beings can never fully understand our own motives, let alone those of
other persons. Therefore, we cannot automatically assume that the actions of
Church leaders in restricting diverse voices were or are motivated by the
desire to preserve their own power, even though power was or is used to control
others.
As
reasonable persons who acknowledge the need for some form of governance,
Catholics believe that Church authorities have the responsibility to articulate
the truth that the Spirit of God continues to speak in the community. The
manner in which we have seen this responsibility exercised in the past has
mostly reflected a distinct worldview which Walter Brueggemann (1978), in his
book, The Prophetic Imagination, calls the “royal
consciousness.” The royal consciousness is a term Brueggemann employs to
describe the dominant culture of the Israelite kings, who ruled the Temple and
its priests. By controlling access to the Temple, the monarchy controlled
access to God. In this consciousness or worldview, authority is conceived as
divinely ordained and therefore not open to other worldviews nor open to
criticism of itself. The faithful have the moral security of knowing that truth
is possessed in its entirety and will be safeguarded unambiguously. Like the
priests of the Jerusalem Temple, Church authorities will communicate divine law
clearly to future generations. Because the Church hierarchy is protected by the
grace of office, just as Israel’s kings were protected by the Davidic
Covenant, their interpretations of the faith are free from error. This does not
preclude a development of beliefs or a deeper understanding of them in the
future, but the doctrine itself, it is maintained, has never been false.
In
such a system, the ecclesial community should be free from anxiety and
confusion regarding church teachings. When one’s beliefs seem vulnerable,
the Church’s representatives provide moral counsel with reassuring
certitude. Priests and religious, as representatives of the Church, must uphold
the teachings strictly. The faithful have confidence in their leaders and need
not be troubled or unsettled by matters of creed or doctrine.
The
hierarchy interprets any expression of doubt or inquiry about a teaching as
weakening or threatening that teaching. Questioning a policy or decision is
perceived as undermining authority. Silencing becomes a necessary means of
dealing with controversies or dissenting views that can cause confusion among
the faithful and pose potential threats to the unity of the Church.
Unlike military dictators who use the power of silencing and disappearances to
maintain their own power, the persons who are enmeshed in the royal
consciousness I have described may not be grasping to preserve their own power.
They see secrecy and silencing as essential in preserving a system they believe
to be divinely ordained and therefore to be honored and protected.
Secrecy and Silencing
At
this point I wish to emphasize, if it is not already clear, that we are
speaking of silencing dissident views or opinions from the public domain or
prohibiting individuals from public discourse about their own experience. We
are not speaking of appropriate silence in the public domain; i.e., the silence
that an individual chooses without being coerced. We are not speaking of the
right of individuals to keep personal or intimate matters private. We are not
speaking of the obligation that professional persons assume to protect client
information from unwarranted access by others.
We
are speaking here of a conflict over power: the power of restricting or
controlling the flow of information. We are speaking here of control over
openness and free expression of ideas and experiences. The control of ideas
usually involves secrecy.
Although there are appropriate times for secrecy, as in jury deliberations or
when one votes in political elections, those in power positions need to be
aware of the dangers of using secrecy. While secrecy gives the individual, such
as the voter, freedom of choice, secrecy can destroy or limit the freedom of
others. Secrecy in an organization can preclude inspection or review; it evades
unwanted interference. Secrecy in any group, including the Church, can prevent
its members from perceiving perilous situations that can damage the mission of
the group. Secrecy and control guard against change and foster the status quo.
Without freedom of expression on religious views within the Church itself, the
community risks the danger of perpetuating erroneous views, such as its former
position on slavery. Without freedom of expression, thought itself is stifled.
We are
reminded of the character Winston Smith in George Orwell’s novel,
Nineteen Eighty-Four, who tried to maintain his autonomy in spite of the
thought-police. Not only prohibited from voicing unorthodox views, Winston
Smith was forbidden even to think them.
The Church’s Teaching
What
justification, if any, is there for the use of secrecy and silencing in the
Church’s teaching? Does Scripture or tradition have any insights to offer
the Christian community on the moral value of these means of preserving unity
and eliminating confusion? Regarding the Church’s tradition, I shall
explore some of the social documents of the Church that represent a relative
newness in the tradition. In particular, I shall examine Pacem in Terris
(1963), Dignitatis Humanae (1965), and Justice in the World
(1971) in reference to their teachings on human rights and expressions of
opinions.
Since
the aggiornamento inaugurated by Pope John XXIII, Catholic social teaching has
departed from the culture of the royal consciousness in favor of the prophetic
imagination, to use Brueggemann’s terminology. Pacem in Terris,
Pope John’s encyclical dealing with peace in the global political
community, opens with a discussion of philosophical principles of order. It
paints a broad picture of the rights and duties of individuals, public
officials, nation states, and the world community.
Pacem in Terris teaches:
The
dignity of the human person...requires that every person enjoy the right to act
freely and responsibly...Each one acts on his or her own decision...without
being moved by force or pressure brought to bear externally (PT, 34).
Does
this mean that Church leaders are exercising force when they impose penalties
of silencing on any person? Is silencing considered an external pressure
brought to bear on an individual? Human reason provides an affirmative answer
to these questions.
In
one of the introductory paragraphs of the encyclical, we read:
By
the natural law, every human being has the right to respect for his or her
person, to a good reputation, to freedom in searching for truth and—within
the limits laid down by the moral order and the common good—in expressing
and communicating his or her opinion..." (PT, 12).
This
papal encyclical says quite boldly that every person has the right to express
and communicate his or her opinion. It should be noted here that the document
is dealing with the public domain. It is no mere private communication of
beliefs that is legitimated.
However, does the nuance—within the limits laid
down by the moral order and the common good—imply that perhaps silencing
can be justified because it is somehow within the limits of the moral order and
in keeping with the common good? My answer is negative. I shall explain why. In
speaking of the essentials of the common good, Pacem in Terris states:
The
common good is intimately bound up with human nature. It can never exist fully
and completely unless...the human person is taken into account (PT,
55).
If
the human person is to be taken into account in ascertaining the common good,
then any injustice to persons cannot contribute to the good of the whole. If
silencing constitutes an injustice to persons, then silencing does not foster
the common good. How then can it be said that silencing causes unjust injury to
persons?
To
answer this question, I rely on the insights of Margaret Farley (1987) in her
article entitled “Moral Discourse in the Public Arena.” The essay
explores the effects of silence on the moral order of the Christian community.
Her thesis is that silencing is a futile strategy for developing the moral
life, that it involves unjust treatment of persons, and ultimately that it does
not serve the common good.
The
primary argument for silencing is to prevent confusion among the People of God
caused by contentious issues. Farley makes the point that, in the contemporary
world of electronic and print media, it is impossible to keep people uninformed
about moral controversies. Abortion, homosexuality, women priests, genetic
engineering, and euthanasia, for example, are discussed regularly by the
mainstream media. The traditional case for silencing has collapsed.
Such
reasoning, moreover, is patronizing. It treats adults as children who must be
protected. There is a difference between adult and child education. Part of
becoming a moral adult involves the ability to tolerate a lack of certitude.
Protecting individuals from confusion and ambiguity does not respect their
autonomy as complete moral agents; in fact, it impedes their full moral
development. Becoming an adult in the faith means a readiness to reject a
self-righteous certitude. Fallible human beings will never possess all the
answers. Inhibiting individuals from moral development by claiming certitude is
an injustice to persons and cannot, therefore, contribute to the common
good.
Silencing also deprives the whole Church from listening to justifications for
all the arguments of a complex issue. Hoarding knowledge, instead of sharing
it, is an injustice to persons and so offends the common good. Therefore, by
reason and the natural law, as Pacem in Terris states, every person has
the right to express and communicate his or her opinion.
Subsequent to Pope John’s encyclical, Pacem in Terris, one of the
documents to emerge from Vatican II was Dignitatis Humanae, the
Declaration on Religious Freedom. It states:
...In matters religious every manner of coercion on the
part of any individual should be excluded (DH, 10).
Because of compromise with the traditionalists at the Council, this document
deals only with immunity from external coercion by the secular state. But the
theory enunciated here forms the basis for positing that silencing a
person’s religious views, even by that person’s religious
institution, is a violation of a basic human right. It harmonizes with Article
19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which is the basic
right to speak by every human individual.
In
addition to these two documents, a third aggiornamento document that is
relevant to the issue of silencing was produced by the Second General Assembly
of the 1971 Synod of Bishops. Entitled Justice in the World, and
affirmed by Pope Paul VI, it asserts that the Gospel mandates justice for the
liberation of all people and that the Church first must be just itself in its
institutional practices. It clearly teaches that there must be freedom of
speech within the Church, as well as outside it. It says: The Church recognizes
everyone’s right to suitable freedom of expression and thought. This
includes the right of everyone to be heard in a spirit of dialogue which
preserves a legitimate diversity within the Church (JW, 44).
It is
significant that, in a document of this high level of authority, the right to
express dissenting views is legitimated. The importance of this document
exceeds the importance of any document produced by a Vatican dicastery because
it bears the weight of the world’s bishops in communion with the Bishop of
Rome. This fact should be noted, especially by the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith [CDF], which has silenced theologians and pastoral
workers even after Vatican II. A higher authority than the CDF has validated
free expression and public debate on controversial theological
issues.
The
phrase “suitable freedom” implies that some “freedom of
expression” may be unsuitable. We are not free, for example, to tell
falsehoods or to malign another’s reputation. Counselors and confessors,
for example, are not free to reveal information about their clients or
penitents. But this is clearly not the content of information or the context of
silencing that is the focus of the present discussion. Justice in the World
clearly states that the freedom of expression that is meant is the freedom
to express views that preserve a legitimate diversity in the Church; i.e., the
articulation of theological arguments which differ from hierarchical teaching.
Therefore, Justice in the World does not justify silencing as a means to
control divergent views.
In
addition, Justice in the World tells us that this freedom to express
ideas in a spirit of dialogue, which safeguards legitimate diversity, is also
the right of priests, religious, bishops, cardinals and popes. In speaking of
rights within the Church that must be preserved, the document says:
No
one should be deprived of his or her ordinary rights because he or she is
associated with the Church in one way or another. (This includes) those who
serve the Church by their labor, including priests and religious...(JW, 41).
So the
notion that Church representatives are obliged to uphold the party line, so to
speak, is challenged. All the people of God have the right to express their
opinion so that the Spirit of God may be made manifest through the entire
community.
Scripture
Thus,
we see that the recent tradition of the Church reflected in Pacem in
Terris, Dignitatis Humanae, and Justice in the World makes a
case against silencing a person’s freedom of speech. Do the Scriptures
condemn or discourage the use of silencing? Is there any defense in Scripture
for using secrecy and silencing to maintain peace and harmony and to avoid
disorder and turmoil? Or are the Scriptures silent about silencing?
There
are at least two Scripture passages that suggest silencing of religious views
among the People of God is inappropriate. The first text occurs in the Gospel
of Matthew, in which Jesus teaches about the reign of God, with the parable of
the weeds and the wheat. When the workers come to the owner of the field and
ask if the weeds should be pulled up and destroyed, the owner replies that the
weeds should be allowed to grow with the wheat until the harvest (Mt 13:30). If
Church authorities regard unorthodox views as weeds that are choking the wheat
of truth, the parable suggests that both traditional and unconventional
opinions should be allowed to flourish until the final time of gathering and
gleaning.
The
second Scripture relevant to the discussion of silencing is found in the Acts
of the Apostles. The Sanhedrin took its second action against the early
Christian community by the arrest and trial of the apostles. The high priest
rebuked the Twelve for disobeying the silencing order already imposed. They
were “not to teach about that name” (AA 5:28). Gamaliel, a member of
the Council that passed judgment on Peter & the apostles, advised the
Sanhedrin to take no punitive action. Gamaliel counseled, “My advice is
that you have nothing to do with these men. Let them alone. If their purpose or
activity is human in its origin, it will destroy itself. If, on the other hand,
it comes from God, you will not be able to destroy them without fighting God
herself" (AA 5:38-39).
Gamaliel’s famous words intimate that silencing
should not be employed to suppress dissension or radical views on the grounds
that a movement or idea will collapse on its own merit if it is not from God.
It is ironic that a student of Gamaliel, a Pharisee named Saul, later appears
in the Acts of the Apostles as the worst silencer and persecutor of the early
Christian community before his conversion. With God’s grace, the People of
God may witness the transformation of modern day Sauls into Pauls.
I
would like to conclude this discussion of silencing by reiterating a principle
put forth by Farley in the article previously mentioned. Shared public
discourse is necessary in an honest search for truth. The truths of our faith
concern the whole Christian community. Living our faith through a close
relationship with God is not the result of merely accepting doctrines or rules.
Living our faith through a close relationship with God comes from pondering our
life experiences and finding divine meaning in them. Therefore, everyone’s
reflection, not just that of the bishops or theologians, is essential to
discern where the Spirit is leading the Church. Everyone’s reflection is
essential for the faith life of the Church. The experience of all, especially
marginalized groups of people, must be included in theological reflection.
“Not every voice can speak for the community; but
the truer voices will be better discerned not by excluding dissent but by
protecting the most fragile voices in our midst” (Farley, 184). Discourse
in the public arena, not silencing, is a moral imperative.
References
Brueggemann, Walter. The Prophetic Imagination. Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1978.
Farley, Margaret. “Moral Discourse in the Public Arena.” In
Vatican Authority and American Catholic Dissent: The Curran Case and Its
Consequences, William W. May (Ed). New York: Crossroad, 1987.
Jeannine Gramick, SSND
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