Do theologians enjoy ‘academic freedom’ in the Church?

My purpose is not to give a full systematic exposition of the doctrine of academic freedom and of the problems connected with it; nor is it to propose precise practical rules for its protection. Such a vast enterprise would be well beyond the scope of this inquiry. I intend to present the issue in fairly general terms, first by outlining its context, then by identifying its basic elements, finally by outlining some practical rules which can be helpful for the protection of this freedom.

What is the context?

The broad context is indicated by the very purpose of the university: to be the house of intellect in the community at large. A university is not an isolated self-serving institution; it exists for the sake of the society surrounding it. That society has created the university and keeps supporting it and renewing it by the influx of persons and funds. The university, in its turn, nourishes the community with knowledge and provides trained persons for all kinds of jobs and tasks. Its operations touch somehow the life of many (all?) of those who live and work outside its boundaries.

It follows that the issue of academic freedom is not merely an internal problem, to be left to and handled by the academicians alone. All those who have an interest in the university, have also an interest in academic freedom.

What is academic freedom?

Let us begin with the general concept of freedom in an organized human society. The life of such a society turns on a balanced play between contrasting forces and interests. One of such a pair of forces is in the right-and-duty situations: if I have the right to a service, someone somewhere has the duty to perform it. Another one is in the freedom-and-restraint situations; if I have the freedom to speak, all others are restrained from interfering with it. Those who have a freedom are like persons living in a protected territory; the others are enjoined from entering it.

In the case of academic freedom the territory in question is the academia. Those who belong to it are entitled to carry out their activities unhampered. Such activities are manifold; the most prominent among them are those which are directly connected with the primary purpose of the university, such as gathering information, proposing insights, testing hypotheses, formulating judgments (probable or certain), communicating knowledge to others, and so forth. Other operations too postulate freedom: the testing of the students, participation in the government of the institution, as well as serving the general public in an intellectual way through lecturing and publishing.

All consiclered, academic freedom is nothing else than the freedom to do what is necessary to help the university to fulfill its purpose. Clearly any community which wants a university in its midst wants academic freedom as well; which is to say that it wants to restrain the citizens from interfering with the academia.

How can academic freedom be assured?

The problem is not a new one; it must have surfaced in the middle ages, otherwise it would be difficult to explain why the universitates studiorum were constantly seeking exemption from local jurisdiction, ecclesiastical and civil, and wished to place themselves under the protection of popes and emperors. Such efforts clearly show a realization that the house of intellect serves a broad human purpose which transcends the local interests. Inside the universities, new institutions sprouted from this conception of freedom, such as internal and autonomous courts of justice, elected representatives to be sent to the parliament, and others.

To this day in some European countries academic freedom is assured by constitutional provisions, not unlike the independence of judges. In the United States accrediting agencies, professional societies, and departments of education of individual states and courts of law, all contribute, each in its own way, to the safeguarding of academic freedom.

In the church, the new Code of Canon Law, lists among the fundamental rights of the faithful the freedom of inquiry:

“Those who are engaged in the study of sacred disciplines, in matters in which they are experts, enjoy the just freedom of inquiry and of expressing their mind prudently, with due obsequium toward the magisterium of the church.” (Canon 218)

This canon is applicable to anyone who is engaged in the study of, say, theology; but the prime place for its application is obviously within the boundaries of the Catholic universities and ecclesiastical faculties. It is reinforced by another one:

“ The faithful are entitled to vindicate and defend lawfully their rights, which they enjoy in the church, before a competent ecclesiastical forum, according to the norm of the law.” (Canon 221 § 1) (29)

29. Unfortunately the provisions of canon law for all practical purposes end there. I say for practical purposes because although theoretically there are ways and means of vindicating rights in the church, in the practical order the procedures are most of the time so complex, protracted and expensive, that a thoughtful canon lawyer will hardly ever counsel someone to initiate such a case.

From: The Church: Learning and Teaching, by Ladislas Örsy, Michael Glazier 1987, chapter 4. Read the whole chapter here.

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