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by Ida Raming (bibliography)
from Theology Digest vol. 29:1 (Spring 1981).
Earlier published as “‘Gleichwertig—aber andersartig.’ Zu
einem üblichen Argumentationsschema gegen das Priestertum der Frau.”
Orientierung 43:20 (Oct 31, 1979) pp. 218-21; here published with
permission of the author and the editor of Orientierung.
Dr. Ida Raming here summarizes the results of a research published (1973) in
a 200-page book. ‘Since woman’s "otherness” is currently one of
the main arguments for excluding women from the priesthood, Dr.Raming examines
its historical consequences for woman’s ecclesial status.
A
frequent argument against admitting women to the priesthood is its “
inappropriateness ”—the unsuitability of woman’s nature for this
calling. The argument is given considerable weight in the literature dealing
with the various reasons for excluding women from priestly office. And since
this assertion that woman’s “different” or “other" nature
is the real reason for her exclusion from the priesthood, it seems good to
embark on a detailed discussion of the historical connections and developments
associated therewith.
This
essay will seek to answer three questions: What is understood here by
“woman’s essence”? Was the exclusion of women from the
priesthood in early and medieval church tradition also based on woman’s
“otherness”? Against the backdrop of these historical associations,
how should we evaluate the formula “equal in worth/different in
nature” and its consequences for woman’s place in the church?
A few
examples illustrate how this essence of woman is described when her exclusion
from the priesthood is discussed. L.Lercher (1950): The male is more
suitable for teaching than the female, for he is by nature more capable of
handling the exertions of mental labor. He is more suited to lead because he is
more intellectual and woman more emotional. M.Premm (1955): Woman is
excluded from the priesthood not because she is of less worth. but because she
is different. Service as a mother is an unofficial priesthood. O.Casel
(1927): The idea of woman is to be a receiver; man is the procreator. Only
the male nature can be incorporated in ordination as mediator of divine life.
Post-Vatican II statements are little different. G. Concetti (1965):
Opposing priesthood for woman, he uses the argument of the order of creation:
the man came first. This order enjoys Christ’s support in his not giving
woman the priesthood. Both (creation and salvation) require man’s role as
leader: old Adam, new Christ. Placing man first does not compromise the
equality and dignity of the sexes. Recent utterances (e.g., the Vatican’s
“Declaration on Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood”)
use the same argumentation, i.e.. factual differences in nature or function or
symbolism of woman
Aristotelian biology
What
it all finally amounts to is the assertion of polar differences: man’s
activity and rationality, woman’s passivity and receptivity; public life
for the man, a hidden and quiet role for the woman.
This
continues the Aristotelian-Thomistic idea of the reproduction process,
assigning to the man the role of procreative, life-bestowing head, and to the
woman the role of receiver, submitter, bearer. Although the errors inherent in
this understanding of reproduction have long been established in the scientific
literature, the theologians in question fail to take them into account.
The
current emphasis thus falls not on woman’s inferiority but on her
“otherness.” And canon law (CIC #968) asserts baldly that only a
baptized male can be validly ordained.
CIC
#968, 1 is based on the mid12th-century collection of sources known as the
Decretum Gratiani. Its ban on women assuming any liturgical function
within the sanctuary is substantiated by various conciliar directives and by
texts like the so-called Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua, going as far back as
Lev 12:1 ff.: 15: 19ff. The thrust is: a low concept of women because of their
sex, no access to the sanctuary, no touching of sacred vessels or the
eucharistic elements, no teaching, no preaching—even baptizing is
forbidden. Man’s God created superiority has to be protected from the
pagan inroads of a female priesthood.
There
are also sociologically conditioned (rabbinic and apostolic) assertions of
woman’s inferiority (e.g., 1Tim 2). Even etymology is drawn into the
controversy: vir is derived from virtus (authority, virtue),
mulier from mollities mentis (softness of mind). Woman’s
ethical, biological, and sociological inferiority grounds the demand for
slavish submission.
Gratian, as well as his successors, feels at home in arguing against
woman’s equality by using Gen 2 and 3 and (pseudo)patristic exegesis of
that and other passages to demonstrate woman’s second-class and second
rate nature. Medieval canonists continue Gratian’s derogation of women by
giving further exegetical support to refusing holy orders to women. Huguccio,
e.g., actually maintains that the dignity of imago Dei, the glory and
honor of God (in the strict sense of the word) is embodied only in the man.
Man comes from God— primal; woman comes from man— derivative and
so not “ordainable.”
About
100 years after Gratian, there appeared the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX
(1234). The context of some regulations shows that apart from the reasons
already given, there is a further motive—the protection of priestly
celibacy.
The
commentators on Gregory’s Decretals (the
‘’Decretalists’’) are no less definite regarding ordination
of women than were Gratian and his successors. Bernhard de Botone, for example,
states that woman may not approach the power of the keys because she is not
God’s image and must serve man in total subordination. Hostiensis defends
woman’s inferior status in both Roman and church law. Since woman must be
under man and is not God’s image, she may not legitimately aspire to
teaching and preaching and so is automatically excluded from orders.
Woman’s ignorance of law and justice is allowed on the grounds that hers
is the weaker sex. the cause and root of her ignorance, foolishness, and
(mental) limitations.
Thus,
as time goes by, there is the increasing tendency for supporters of the
“masculine argument” to insist that their anti-feminist position is
not discriminatory but natural, i.e., based on the created difference in nature
between men and women.
A clear contradiction
We
are faced here with a contradiction: on the one hand (esp. in view of
scientific insights into human reproduction) the concept of woman’s
inferiority has been deprived of its ground; on the other, woman’s current
legal position in the church is basically identical with her status in medieval
canon law—resulting, undeniably, from a low evaluation of women. That is
why, despite the acknowledged equality of the sexes, one has recourse to such
threadbare proofs to defend or justify woman’s detrimental status.
Since
the “otherness” of woman has the same legal result (exclusion from
the priesthood) as the earlier assertion of woman’s lesser value, one can
only assume that this insistence on otherness serves either as an instrument of
repression or—consciously or unconsciously—as a cover-up for
regarding woman as inferior. Indeed, what theologians say about the nature of
woman, despite protestations to the contrary, is still clearly influenced in
part by the acceptance of woman’s inferiority which formerly prevailed.
The history of feminism shows that an outmoded concept of woman’s nature
has been a hindrance to her professional development. We forget that the
professions of teacher, doctor, lawyer, engineer were also closed to women by
referring to their “otherness.”
An open question
We
know today, from sociological and ethnological research, that the
differentiation of the sexes is historically conditioned. Though anchored in
the psychic and metaphysical structure of woman’s nature, the traditional
picture of woman was derived from her past very limited field of operation
(home and family). Hence a description of woman’s nature that integrates
all the individual expressions of her sex is currently impossible, for
“when one sex assumes a dominating position, the enduring difference
between the sexes is not ascertainable’’ (S. Hunke).
How
greatly the church still represses women is seen in the recent decree from the
highest authority (John Paul II in America) that women will not be admitted to
the priestly office, and this because it goes counter to Jesus’ intention.
Without asking or listening to those concerned (not to say, letting them
decide!), their fate is thus settled. And one feels no shame in enlisting the
intention of Jesus to support this “procedure.” Despite protestations
to the contrary, precisely therein lies the blatant offense against the human
rights and dignity of woman: the man in the church defines the essence,
nature of woman; he determines what her tasks in the church are or are
not; he arrogates to himself knowing and interpreting God’s will
for woman.
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