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1266 - 1308 AD
John Duns Scotus, a Franciscan friar, was one of the most influential
philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages. He lectured at Cambridge,
Oxford and Paris. In the post-scholastic age (16th - 18th centuries) his
followers among Catholic theologians outnumbered those following St. Thomas
Aquinas.
The text here quoted is from Scotus’s commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard, printed in the Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, ed.
Vives, Paris 1894, vol. 24, ‘Reportata Parisiensia’, Liber 4,
Distinctio 25, Quaestio 2, pp.367-371. For Latin original,
click here!
Translated especially for womenpriests.org from the
original Latin
by Dr. Mary Ann Rossi -- credits
Paragraph numbering by John Wijngaards, for easy
reference
Book IV, Distinctio XXV. Question II.
Whether the female sex or a youthful age should impede the taking
of Orders.
Reasons why not [= why the female sex or youth should not
impede].
§1. First negative argument.
In Galatians 3 it is
written: ‘In Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female, slave nor
free’; therefore neither sex nor condition seems to impede the
reception of Orders. And in the same place it is said that it is mainly
Christ who ordains; therefore, etc. Next, other sacraments do not discriminate,
so that each sex can truly receive them. It is clear by this logically that all
[sacraments] can be equally administered to women as well as to men.
§2. Second negative argument.
Also in Canon Law
(Distinct. 32, last chapter, ‘Presbytera’; and first chapter
‘women priests’, and Distinct. 27, quest. 1.) it is said that a
“diaconissa” [woman deacon] should not be ordained before she is
forty. Therefore women can receive major Orders, such as the Diaconate and
Presbyterate.
§3. Third negative argument.
Also, that young age
should not impede the reception of Orders is shown in this that young children
can receive other Sacraments that imprint a character, such as Baptism and
Confirmation; therefore also the Sacrament of Orders, which also imprints a
character.
§4. Fourth negative argument.
Also, someone ordained to
minor orders under the years of discretion, may not be reordained later, just
as it is held, except for a cleric promoted by a leap [= by omitting an
intermediate order]. And this should not be the case unless he had truly received those
Orders at the time.
On
the other hand: [= arguments to show the female sex and young age
impede]
§5. First positive argument.
The fact that the female
sex impedes the taking of Orders, is clear in the Decrees [of Gratian],
distinc. 23. We
do not permit women consecrated to God, or nuns, to touch the sacred vessels or
the sacred palls, or to carry incense around the altar, etc.,
because—there is no doubt to any wise person— all such ministries [of
women] are filled with reprehension and condemnation. But what impedes the handling
and touching of the sacred objects, impedes much more the reception of Orders.
Therefore if sex impedes in the first [case], then also in the second.
§6. Second positive argument. Also, it is forbidden to a
priest to cultivate his hair, because he needs to be given the tonsure, or be
shaved to his glory (dist. 13 on clerics. And besides on the life and hon. cler.
‘If someone’) but about women it is found: (1. Corinth. 11) It is base for a woman to be
shaved, for if she grows her hair it is to her glory. Therefore since she cannot be
ordained without first being shaved, such a tonsure would be to her ignominy,
and not to her glory.
§7. Third positive argument.
Also, that age impedes,
is held in distinct. 77. The subdeacon may be ordained not earlier than twenty years of
age, and in the
following chapter: the Canon says It was agreed that Deacons may not be
ordained, nor may virgins be consecrated, nor may lectors address the public
before the age of twenty-five.
Scholium
§8.
First statement:
Boys lacking
reason are ordained irreverently, because they are not able to receive [Orders]
with reverence.
§9.
Secondly: Boys having reason are ordained licitly to
minor orders, but not to sacred orders up to a certain age; which is 22 for the
Subdeaconate, 23 for the Deaconate, and 25 for the Presbyterate, but it
suffices for that year to have begun.
§10.
Thirdly:
Sacred Orders
may be conferred validly on each of these, unless the lack of reason is an
obstruction. (D.
Thom. here quest. 2, art. 2, D. Bonavent. art. 2, quest. 1 Richard. art.9.
quest. 2. Palud. quest. 2. Gabr. quest. 1. Sot. quest.1.art.2.)
§11.
Fourthly:
Women are
incapable of Orders by divine law , and if they are ordained, it means nothing.
The contrary is
recorded as heresy by Ambros. in 1.Timoth.3.Epiph. haer.49. August.haer.27.
Those who hold
that minor orders have been instituted by the Church would not deny that they
can be conferred upon women; on which point see Vasquez d. 245. cap.2.and
disp.297.cap.2.23.
I respond to the question [= Duns Scotus’ own
judgment:]
§12.
I say that for anyone to
be excluded from the reception of Orders can be understood in two ways; either
one may be excluded from the reception of Orders because of the correctness and
appropriateness of the manner of receiving them, since such Orders should be
received honestly and correctly, with due reverence; or one is excluded from
the reception of Orders because of necessity, and this is twofold, either
because of the necessity of precept or because of the necessity of fact.
[The impediment of young age]
§13.
I say that a youthful age
excludes one from the taking of Orders according to the first mode, because
boys cannot receive the sacrament of Orders with due reverence, and therefore
it would be conferred and received dishonorably. As to the second mode, a boy
cannot receive Orders, especially Holy Orders, because he is forbidden to
receive them by the necessity of Church law, just as it is clear in
distinct.77
above where the
age of one who is eligible to take Orders is determined; and even if that
determination is not held until the years [mentioned], it must be held with
regard to the age of discretion, because it is always required, by every Decree
[of Church law], for the one receiving Holy Orders to be of the age of
discretion.
§14.
As for the other Orders,
not Holy Orders, there is no Church rule that one could not receive them before
the age of discretion, as is clear from above, and in ‘Extra for a
cleric promoted by a leap’.
§15.
But young age is
reasonably excluded from the reception of Holy Orders, because the vow
of chastity is attached to this act, which requires the use of reason in
receive Orders, and the [power] of deliberation regarding the vow, and
familiarity with writing, (Extra, regarding the time of ordination, the last chapter,
‘no Bishop’), which also speaks about the first tonsure; but a boy under the years
of discretion has none of these.
§16.
As to the third mode, to
be sure by necessity of fact, I say that young age does not exclude the
reception of any Holy Orders, since if such a person receives some Order de
facto, he truly receives it and should not be reordained at another time.
And the reason for this is that with respect to whatever sacrament that is not
repeatable, any disposition that precedes the disposition of the sacrament is
not necessarily required on the part of the one receiving [it] , such as it is
in confession, but it is only required that one does not actual make or place
an obstacle. The proof for this is that someone can receive the grades, or the
character, or the power of Orders, before he carries out the act of that Order,
and the same for the character of Baptism, or of Confirmation. But
Orders, or ordination, is a sacrament of this kind that is not repeatable;
therefore the only thing required on the part of the recipient of Orders is
that there is not contrary action; a young person receiving Orders is not
disposed in a contrary manner because he does not have the use of reason, nor
the deliberation of will; therefore, etc.
[The impediment of the female sex]
§17.
But as for the sex, I say
that the sex of a woman simply impedes the taking of Orders, and this as much
from integrity as from the necessity of precept and fact; for it is not
honorable for women to minister in any way in such a sacrament.
§18.
They are also excluded
from taking Orders by the necessity of precept and by the necessity of fact,
not only of the Church or by the precept of the Apostles. Because I do not
believe that by the institution of the Church or by the precept of the Apostles
there was removed any useful degree [= ecclesiastical grade?] towards salvation
from any person, and much less from a whole sex in life. Therefore if neither
the Apostles nor the Church are able to remove from any one person, and much
less from the whole female sex, any useful degree towards salvation, unless
Christ, who is their head, intended that it be removed, then it must be that
Christ, who instituted this sacrament, laid it down by precept.
§19. First Congruence. There can be a twofold congruence to this. One
is this: Every Order is received towards the priesthood and teaching. But
teaching belongs chiefly to priests, as it is held in dist. 16. quaest. 1 we
add; and not to
Deacons, unless by commission, when a sermon or an instruction is regarded as
the reading of the Gospel, which it is fitting for deacons to read. But that
deed is prohibited to women, 1. Timoth. 2. ‘Let the women learn in
silence’, and ‘I do not permit them [women] to speak or to
teach’, where a gloss [reads], ‘not only I but also the Lord does not
permit it’;and this is so because of the weakness of their intellect, and the
mutability of their emotions, which they commonly suffer more than men. For a
Teacher ought to have a lively intellect in the recognition of truth, and
stability of emotion in its confirmation.
§20.
Therefore, whatever is
added from the Decrees [of Church law] or precepts of Paul, for excluding women
from receiving [Holy] Orders, are nothing else but supplements Christ’s
teaching about this, or rather expressions of it; for the Mother of Christ was
most worthy and most holy and nevertheless power of this kind was not conferred
upon her.
§21.
And if you argue about
Magdalene, who was an Apostle, and a preacher, and put in charge of all women
sinners, I answer that she was a singular woman, and singularly accepted by
Christ, and such personal privilege follows a person, and is extinguished with
that person. See (Extra de reg. juris, in 6.lib and elsewhere) those who are outside the
common law may by no means be drawn to prove the opposite (in the same
place).
§22. Second Congruence. The second congruence could be this: [Holy]
Orders, as was said above, represents some degree of eminence over other people
in the Church, and for an excellent action which in some way ought to be
signified by an eminent condition and position in nature. Woman however
possesses a [state of] natural subjection with respect to man. Therefore she
ought to have no degree of eminence over any man, because as much by nature as
by condition and nobility women are more ignoble than any man; whence after the
fall, the Lord subjected her to the rule and power of the man. But if she were
able to receive some [Holy] Order in the Church, she would be able to preside
over and to have authority, which is contrary to her condition. Therefore the
Bishop in conferring Orders on a woman, not only does wrong, because it is
against Christ’s precept, but rather does nothing, nor does she receive
anything, because she herself is not material capable of receiving this
sacrament. Because Christ instituted that this sacrament be conferred only upon
an individual of the human species and the masculine sex. It is clear from the
authority of the Apostle,in
Timoth.2.
[Objection]
§23.
But against this an
objection is made: When there is an agent and a receiver of the same species,
there is an effect, since the effect does not depend upon others, nor does the
diversity depend upon the diversity of anyone of them, (12. Met. text.
com.18.). But
the Bishop conferring the sacrament of Orders upon a woman, is an agent of the
same species as the receiver, because the nature of the species is not
dependent upon sex; therefore with the same nature the ensuing effect is of the
same nature on a woman ordained, as on a man.
[Reply to the objection]
§24.
I say that the major [the
first part of the argument] is this true of a natural agent, and when there is
no impediment on the part of the receiver; but if the principal agent was a
voluntary agent, and the instrumental agent acts only in virtue of the
principal agent, because he is completely determined by the Superior agent for
the carrying out of some determined action, just as is it in the position of
the Bishop with respect to God, who has placed an impediment on the part of one
receiver, and not on the other, even though of the same nature, because of the
different make up of the sex, -- then it does not follow that if those
receiving are of the same nature, the effect would be of the same nature. For
if the Bishop confers Orders upon a woman, he would do nothing as to that
sacrament, because he is not the principal agent impressing the character of
Orders, but only the secondary and instrumental one; and therefore he only
impresses the character in such material receiving Orders, as has been
determined for him as suitable by God, who is the main agent to impress the
character. And that material which is not impeded by the condition of sex, is
only the male of the human species.
[Reply to the first argument] (see §1)
§25.
As to the first argument
that opposes my conclusion, when it is said: ‘In Christ there is neither male not
female, slave, nor free man’, I say that although with regard to salvation
and eternal life there is no difference between male and female, slave nor
freeman, there is nevertheless a difference between them with regard to
possessing office and eminent position in the Church, because in this a man is
preferred to a woman, as it has been said. But as for the taking up of other
sacraments, women are capable.
[Reply to the second argument] (see §2)
§26.
As for the second
argument about ‘Presbytera’ [woman priest], I say that the term
Presbytera is applied not to a woman ordained in Holy Orders, but an elderly
widowed woman, about whom it is presumed that she has been tested and found
holy among women. ‘Presbyterae’ can also be used for the wives of priests of
Greece, so named from the offices of their husbands. Hence in Law ‘presbyterae’
do not signify
ordained women, as you might reasonably suppose, because Canon. distinct.
27.c.1. says: We
have decreed that those women ought not to be established as ordained in the
Church, It
doews not signify those among good women that are outstanding in their lives,
like priests, but some good matron widows, or those who ought to surpass others
in their lives and manners. But ‘ Diaconissa’ [Deaconess] means
Abbess, according to the gloss there. But it might be better say that
Deaconesses can be understood to be women who have the task by an ordination of
the Abbess or of the community to read the homily of the gospel at [the prayer
of Matins], which is not the action of any [Holy] Order.
[Reply to the third argument] (see §3-4)
§27.
As for the other
argument, when it is said that young age impedes according to the Canons [of
Church law], I say that in antiquity the time of life for receiving Orders was
later than now, because now men are more quickly capable of trickery than they
were then, and therefore one is not so limited now as earlier, and because men
now are prone to evil, it is good, to forestall this evil, to instruct them in
their youth so that they may be able to receive this sacrament
worthily.
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